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I.

Introduction*
A. Issues
This memorandum addresses the issue whether there is precedent from the International

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) to admit the testimony of a dead witness into evidence before the ICTR. Since
the ICTY and the ICTR have essentially hybridized the common law and civil law traditions to
create functioning tribunals, it is important to explore how the testimony of dead witnesses is
treated in different jurisdictions. The memorandum explores how the Tribunals have interpreted
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. It also examines how the testimony of dead witnesses is
treated in civil law jurisdictions and falls under the exceptions to the hearsay rule in common law
jurisdictions. Finally, the memorandum examines how the jurisprudence of the ICTY and the
ICTR establish precedent for allowing the testimony of a dead witness to be admitted in
evidence.
B. Summary of Conclusions
i. The ICTR has the authority under the Rules of Evidence and Procedure to
Admit into Evidence the Testimony of a Dead Witness as to the Acts and
Conduct of the Accused in the Indictment
The Tribunals, under Rule 89(C) “may hear any evidence that is deemed to have
probative value.”1 Rule 92bis allows for proof of facts other than by oral evidence. Rule
92bis(C) deems written statements by a person who has subsequently died to be admissible if the
tribunal is satisfied on a balance of probabilities and finds that the statement is reliable.2 This is
*

Issue 7: Is there authority for allowing the testimony of a dead witness, as to the acts and conduct of the accused as
charged in the indictment, to be admitted in evidence to the ICTR? Consider Rule 89 and Rule 92bis, the case law
of the ICTY and ICTR, and state practice in common-law and civil-law jurisdictions.

1

MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE
NUREMBERG 169 (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 73].

1

the only mention of a dead witness in the ICTR Rules. Rule 92bis(A),3 however, requires that
such statements go to proof of a matter other than the acts and conduct of the accused in the
indictment.
The Tribunal has shown great flexibility in interpreting the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, and there is no reason why the Judges may not amend Rule 92bis to allow for such
statements to go to proof as to the acts and conduct of the accused in the indictment. Under Rule
6, the Judges, the Prosecutor or the Registrar may propose an amendment of the Rules.4 While
Rule 6(C) stipulates that “an amendment shall enter into force immediately, but shall not operate
to prejudice the rights of the accused in any pending case,”5 the Tribunal’s main purpose is to
facilitate justice. The Tribunal has discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence, and
does so if it is relevant and has probative value. Under the unique circumstances which gave rise
to the creation of the Tribunal, any testimony which would be in the interest of justice should be
admitted.
ii. The Tribunal May be Guided by the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule Found in
the Common Law in Allowing the Testimony of a Dead Witness to be Admitted
in Evidence
The testimony of a dead witness is generally regarded to be hearsay evidence. In
Blaškić6, the Trial Chamber “interpreted Article 21(4)(e) as applying only to those witnesses

2

Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan Persons Responsible for Genocide and other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (adopted 29 June 1995) (amended 12 Jan.
1996, 15 May 1996, 4 July 1996, 5 June 1997, 8 June 1998, 1 July 1999, 21 Feb. 2000, 26 June 2000, 3 Nov. 2000,
31 May 2001, 6 July 2002, and 27 May 2003) [hereinafter ICTR Rules], Rule 92bis(C). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebooks at Tab 5].

3

Id. Rule 92bis(A).

4

Id. Rule 6.

5

Id. Rule 6(C).

2

called before the Trial Chamber and not to the statements of witnesses admitted as hearsay.”7 A
defense objection to the admission of hearsay evidence was rejected because Rule 89(C)
“authorises the Trial Chamber to receive any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative
value and that the indirect nature of the testimony depends on the weight which the Judges give
to it and not on its admissibility.”8 The Tribunal also stated a statement of a deceased witness
given under oath to the Prosecutor’s investigators was “clearly one of the exceptions to the
principle of oral witness testimony, in particular for cross-examination, accepted in the different
national and international legal systems and therefore they admitted the said statement in
evidence but reserved the right to give it the appropriate weight when the time came.”9 While
there is no Confrontation Clause in the language of the statute, the Tribunal could follow recent
U.S. jurisprudence that does not regard hearsay evidence as “testimonial,” and therefore is not
precluded from being admitted by the Confrontation Clause.
Rule 92bis(C) allows for written statements by a person who has subsequently died to be
admitted into evidence. This rule, in combination with the Tribunal’s ability to admit into
evidence testimony it deems to be relevant and to have probative value, should allow for the
testimony of a dead witness to be admitted in evidence.
iii. The Admission of the Testimony of a Dead Witness is in the Interests of Justice
But May Infringe Upon the Rights of the Accused Before the Tribunal under the
Statute

6

Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, Trial Chamber (3 Mar. 2000). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebooks at Tab 25].
7

JOHN E. ACKERMAN & EUGENE O’SULLIVAN, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 128 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 55].
8

Blaškic, Judgement (TC), para. 36. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 25].

9

Id.

3

The testimony of a dead witness may be highly relevant and have high probative value in
a case before the Tribunal. However, evidence that is highly relevant and highly probative may
also be highly prejudicial to the accused. In common law jurisdictions, such evidence would be
excluded either at the judge’s discretion, or because it does not fall within one of the exceptions
to the hearsay rule. In the United States, if the probative value is equal to the potential prejudice
to the accused, evidence is admitted. If the prejudice outweighs the probative value, then it does
not. Rule 89(B)10 implies that the admission of evidence is at the discretion of the judges, and it
is therefore necessary for them to implement a balancing test that ensures that the rights of the
accused are being protected.
II.

Factual Background
The ICTY and the ICTR are ad hoc tribunals that were created under the Section VII

authority of the U.N. Security Council.11 The Tribunal refuses to be hindered
by a technical approach to the admission of evidence in their search for the truth.
This is best illustrated by their approach to hearsay evidence, but is also reflected
in the admission of documents and affidavits. In all these matters the tribunals
have adopted a liberal approach, not fettered by common law rules.12
Hearsay evidence was accepted at both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals in the form of oral
evidence and affidavits.13 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence are essentially the same for both
the ICTY and the ICTR, and thus, the precedent of the ICTY concerning their application is

10

ICTR Rules, supra note 2, Rule 89(B). “In cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Chamber shall
apply rules of evidence which best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and are consonant with the
spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 6].
11

Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, International Humanitarian Law from Nuremberg to Rome: The Weighty Precedents
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 14 PACE INT’L L. REV. 273, 275 (2002). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebooks at Tab 90].

12

Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and
Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 725, 745 (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 89].

13

Id.

4

relevant to the cases that are before the ICTR. The ICTY also looks to jurisprudence of the
ICTR when crafting opinions and judgments.
Under Article 14 of the ICTR Statute, the judges are to adopt “the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence . . . of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia with such changes as they
deem necessary.”14 In interpreting the Rules of Evidence and Procedure the judges of the ICTY
have often followed the adversarial approach found in common law jurisdictions, even though
the Rules were also influenced by civil law.15
The ICTY and the ICTR have addressed the issue of hearsay evidence from their
inception. In Tadić, the Appeals Chamber held that a prior inconsistent statement, for example,
“is admissible for the truth of its contents, but the weight to be given to the prior statement – as
hearsay material – will depend upon the infinitely variable circumstances which surround
hearsay material.”16 While the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the ICTY in 1994
“are an amalgamation of the civil and common law traditions,”17 the interpretation of the rules,
regarding witnesses and hearsay, often departs from the common law tradition. The drafters of
the Statutes creating the Tribunals also looked to customary international law and international
conventions when delineating the rights of the accused, witnesses, and the victims.

14

Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Persons
Responsible for Genocide and other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between 1
January 1994 and 31 December 1994, adopted by Security Council on 8 Nov. 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute], Article 14. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 8].

15

1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 416 (1998).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 71].

16

ACKERMAN & O’SULLIVAN,

supra note 7, at 425. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 55].

17

Mercedeh Momeni, Balancing the Procedural Rights of the Accused Against a Mandate to Protect Victims and
Witnesses: An Examination of the Anonymity Rules of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 41 HOW. L.J. 155, 159 (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 91].

5

III.

The Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda
A. Rule 89 and 92bis
The Tribunals are able to interpret the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as they see fit.

“In interpreting the Rules, the Tribunals have applied Rule 89(B). The ICTY has held that
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is applicable to the ICTY Statute,
even though it is a sui generis instrument.18 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, states “a treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of their object and purpose.”19
“The ICTY employs a hybrid admissibility standard for witness testimony. Originally
there was an expressed preference for live testimony in Rule 90(A), along with a residual power
in Rule 89(C) to admit any relevant evidence the judges deem “probative.’”20 While the
Tribunal has the ability to admit hearsay testimony into evidence under Rule 89 and 92bis, this
ability, which serves to promote justice, seems to go against the rights of the accused to confront
his or her accuser. If an out of court statement is offered for its truth, then it is hearsay. The key
factor if that the statement has not been made under oath before the Tribunal. This means that
the witness has not appeared before the Court, but full weight should be given to their testimony.
If the accused cannot cross-examine the witness, then there is no way for him or her to verify the
reliability of the witness’s testimony.

18

May & Wierda, supra note 12, at 736. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 89].

19

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (entered into force
Jan. 27, 1980). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 13].

20

Patricia M. Wald, Dealing with the Witnesses in War Crimes Trials: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunals, 5
YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 217, 227 (2002) [hereinafter Wald (2002)]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at
Tab 95].
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Rule 89 seeks to apply rules of evidence that favor a fair determination of matters before
the Tribunal. “The only limitations on the admissibility of hearsay are the general requirements
of probative value and relevance.”21 In Tadić, the ICTY stated “the mere fact that particular
testimony was in the nature of hearsay did not operate to exclude it from the category of
admissible evidence.”22 Any objections to the acceptance of hearsay evidence in Tadić were
“not usually sustained and the testimony in question was admitted into evidence and assessed in
the usual way for its probative value pursuant to Rule 89.”23
The ICTY addressed the admission of the written statement of a deceased witness in
Kordić and Čerkez.24 The Prosecution attempted to enter into evidence “two unsworn statements
of witnesses who had subsequently died.”25 The Prosecution sought to enter the statements
under Rule 89(C). The Trial Chamber admitted the first deceased statement noting that it
had not been (and could not now be) subject to cross-examination and was not
given under oath; further, the Trial Chamber noted that consistent with the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, it would not be possible to
convict the accused on the basis of the deceased statement alone, if
uncorroborated.26

21

Kristina D. Rutledge, “Spoiling Everything”—But for Whom? Rules of Evidence and International Criminal
Proceedings, 16 REGENT U.L. REV. 151, 169-170 (2003/2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab
92].

22

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgement, Trial Chamber (7 May 1997), para. 555.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 44].

23

Id. at para. 556.

24

Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-AR 73.5, Decision on Appeal Regarding Statement of a
Deceased Witness, Appeals Chamber (21 July 2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 36].

25

Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement, Trial Chamber (26 Feb. 2001), Annex IV,
para. 30. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 37].

26

Kordić and Čerkez, Judgement (TC), Annex IV, para. 31.
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On 21 July 2000, The Appeals Chamber ruled that this deceased statement was inadmissible,
holding that “the Rules express a preference for in-court testimony”27 “Rule 89(C) must be
interpreted so that safeguards are provided to ensure that the Trial Chamber can be satisfied that
the evidence is reliable.”28 The Appeals Chamber also held that the deceased statement did not
contain any of the required indicia of reliability as it was not given under oath before a judge,
subject to cross-examination, corroborated, and was not given at the time or near the time of the
events in question.29
“Although national rules of evidence are not binding on the Rwanda Tribunal, these rules
may provide further guidance in the form of general principles of law.”30 Rule 89(D) of the
ICTY Rules states that the “Trial Chamber may exclude relevant evidence ‘if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.”31 The ICTR did not adopt this text
of Rule 89(D). Instead, Rule 89(D) of the ICTR Rules provides that “a Chamber may request

27

Kordić and Čerkez, Decision on Appeal Regarding Statement of a Deceased Witness (AC), para 19. [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 36].

28

Id. at para. 22

29

Kordić and Čerkez, Judgement (TC), Annex IV, para. 33.

30

Rutledge, supra note 21, at 564. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 92].

31

Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991 (adopted 11 Feb. 1994) (amended 5 May 1994, 4 Oct. 1994, 30 Jan. 1995, further amended 3 May 1995, 15
June 1995, 6 Oct. 1995, 18 Jan. 1996, 23 Apr. 1996, 25 June 1996, 5 July 1996, 3 Dec. 1996, 25 July 1997, 20 Oct.
1997, 12 Nov, 1997, 9 July 1998, 10 July 1998, 4 Dec. 1998, 23 Feb. 1999, 2 July 1999, 17 Nov. 1999, 14 July
2000, 1 Dec. 2000, 13 Dec. 2000, 12 Apr. 2001, 12 July 2001, 13 December 2001, 23 Apr. 2002, 11 July 2002, 12
July 2002, 10 Oct. 2002, 12 Dec, 2002, 24 June 2002, and 17 July 2003), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.28 [hereinafter ICTY
Rules], Rule 89(D). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 7].
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verification of the authenticity of evidence obtained out of court.”32 The ICTR decided “to allow
the judges to evaluate the worth of the evidence after it has been admitted.”33
Article 14(3)(e) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
asserts that an accused has the right “to examine, or have examined the witnesses against him
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as the witnesses against him.”34 In the inquisitorial or civil law system, the judge or
trier of fact questions witnesses. The provisions of Rule 90,35 which assets a preference for live
testimony and Article 20(4)(e),36 which delineates a defendant’s right to examine witnesses
against him, generally seem to “preclude hearsay evidence . . . since the declarant of the
statement is not present before the Trial Chamber or a Presiding Officer appointed thereby and
the defense has no opportunity to examine the declarant.”37 In Tadić, “the Trial Chamber
reasoned that . . . a rule against hearsay is not warranted during bench trials, where the judges are
able by virtue of their training and experience to hear the evidence in the context in which it was
obtained and accord it appropriate weight.”38

32

ICTR Rules, supra note 2, Rule 89(D). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 6].

33

Rutledge, supra note 21, at 565. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 92].

34

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 14(3)(e), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177 (entered
into force Nov. 23, 1976). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 4].

35

ICTR Rules, supra note 2, Rule 90(A). “Witnesses shall, in principle, be heard directly by the Chambers, unless a
Chamber has ordered that the witness be heard by means of a deposition as provided for by Rule 71.” [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 6].

36

ICTR Statute, supra note 14, Article 20(4)(e). “In determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the
present Statute, the accused shall be entitled to examine, have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him or her.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 8].
37

Rutledge, supra note 21, at 565. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 92].

38

1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 15, at 566. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 71].
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Rule 89(D) states that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by
the need for a fair trial. Judges at the ICTY and the ICTR “not only pass judgment on the law,
but also on the facts. Considered in that light, it would be advisable to see to it that the judges
who decide on the admissibility of the evidence are not also members of the chamber…so as to
avoid…trial judges being tainted by inadmissible evidence.”39
Regarding the admissibility of hearsay in Blaškić, the judges noted “that neither common
law nor civil law rules regarding admissibility standards apply.”40 The judges in Blaškić also
noted that various exceptions to hearsay exist in common law countries and often overshadow
the hearsay rule itself.41 The ICTY in Blaškić allowed for the statement of a dead witness who
had died of natural causes to be admitted into evidence pursuant to Article 21(4)(e) and Rule 89.
The statement of the witness, Midhat Haškić, “was given under oath to the Prosecutor’s
investigators and . . . said statement was disclosed by [the Prosecutor] to the Defence on 11
October 1996.”42
The Trial Chamber in Tadić “acknowledged that Article 21 of the Statute provides
minimum judicial guarantees to which all defendants are entitled and reflects the internationally

39

Michaïl Wladimiroff, “Rights of Suspect and Accused,” in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND CRIMINAL COURTS 417-450, 437-438
(Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at
Tab 75].
40

Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, “Trial Procedures and Practices,” in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS 548-622, 580.
Footnote 161 states: “It is important to note that the admission of hearsay, when applied fairly and equally, does not
necessarily operate to the prejudice of the accused, since the accused is also permitted to introduce out-of-court
statements made by witnesses. Hence, the admission of hearsay does not necessarily violate the principle of equality
of arms.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 75]
41

Id. at 580 n. 162.

42

Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision on the Defence Motion to Admit into Evidence the Prior
Statement of Deceased Witness Midhat Haškić, Trial Chamber (29 Apr. 1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebooks at Tab 22].
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recognized standards of due process as set forth in Article 14 of the ICCPR.”43 Rule 89(D) states
that the Trial Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the need to ensure a fair trial.
In Delalić and Blaškić, the ICTY determined that hearsay is admissible evidence, with
the judges following Rule 89(C). Gabrielle Kirk McDonald notes that no confrontation clause
exists in the Statute of the ICTY.44 “The confrontation clause is Amendment 6 of the United
States Constitution. Our statute says that the accused has the right to examine or cross examine
witnesses against him.”45 What McDonald says is true. There is no confrontation clause present
in Article 21(4)(e) of the ICTY Statute or Article 20(4)(e) of the ICTR Statute. The
confrontation clause guarantees the right of the accused to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, but it is only invoked in an instance where a statement is “testimonial.” Hearsay statements
are arguably not “testimonial,” as the declarant is not testifying live before the Tribunal.
B. An Amendment to Rule 92bis under Rule 6 of the ICTR Rules
Rule 92bis “allows a witness’s written statement in lieu of oral testimony so long as it
helps prove ‘a matter other than the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the
indictment.”46 Rule 92bis(C) allows for a “written statement…by a person who has subsequently

43

GERT-JAN G.J. KNOOPS, DEFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 219 (2001). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 67].

44

Kitty Felde, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Alan Tieger & Michaïl Wladimiroff, War Crimes Tribunals: The Record
and the Prospects: The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, 13 AM. J. INT’L L. REV. 1441, 1465 (1998). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebooks at Tab 86].

45

Id.

46

Wald (2002), supra note 20, at 227. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 95].
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died” to be admitted if the Trial Chamber is satisfied on a balance of probabilities, and finds
from the circumstance under which the statement was made that it is reliable.”47
By not relying on the written record “it becomes difficult or impossible to obtain
competent evidence early on, and to disinter it, when obtained, after long entombment in the file.
The disappearance of a single witness can ruin even a carefully prepared case.”48 If a witness
dies during trial, it may adversely affect the defendant’s case, as he or she may not have had the
opportunity to cross-examine them. Rule 92bis(A) precludes a written statement from going to
proof of the acts and conduct of the accused in the indictment. If a witness is unavailable to
testify because they are deceased, then the Tribunal would have to rely on their written
statement. While it would be preferable for the statement to have been given under oath for
purposes of reliability, it would not be in the interests of justice to prevent the testimony from
being admitted because it is a written statement. If the deceased individual was one of the only
witnesses who could identify the accused or corroborate the charges listed in the indictment, the
Prosecutor, under Rule 92bis(A), would not be able to proceed with their case without such key
testimony. Rule 6 authorizes an amendment to the Rules as long as they do not infringe upon the
rights of the accused under Article 20(4)(e). However, the Tribunal has allowed for evidence to
come in under Rule 89 that many would deem to be prejudicial to the accused. The admission of
hearsay testimony under Rule 89 has been argued to be prejudicial to the accused in several cases
before the Tribunals, but has been allowed by the Judges. Following this reasoning, an
amendment to Rule 92bis to allow for a written statement to go to proof as to the acts and

47

ICTR Rules, supra note 2, Rule 92bis(C). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 6].

48

MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL
PROCESS 61 (1986). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 61].
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conduct of the accused would be consistent with the past decisions and judgments of the ICTY
and the ICTR.
IV.

The Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence in Civil Law and Common Law
Jurisdictions
A. Civil Law Jurisdictions
Although countries outside of the common law’s compass are not unaware of
hearsay dangers, their reaction to them seldom assumes the form of exclusionary
rules. Where it does, as is sporadically the case in criminal procedure, the
embrace of the exclusionary option is rooted as much in due process values as it
is in the desire to protect the adjudicator from unreliable information.49

In continental legal systems, the judge serves as the fact-finder at trial and examines all the
evidence that is relevant to the subject matter of the case. “The principle of immediacy”
demands “that evidence be presented to the full court, and that witnesses appear personally
before the decision maker.”50
i. The European Court of Human Rights
“Even if precedent were to govern international judicial decision-making in the criminal
jurisdiction it would be essentially influenced by the contesting notions of the law which come
before the trial chambers from their origin in different traditions.”51 “There is a heavy reliance
on the oral testimony of witnesses before international criminal tribunals. This is consistent with
the desire, for example, of the ICTY to represent the process of trial as publicly as possible.”52
The ICTY in Delalić stated that “viva voce testimony is an essential part of the evidence before

49

MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 15 (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab
60].

50

Mirjan R. Damaška, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REV. 425, 446-447 (1992). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebooks at Tab 83].
51

Mark Findlay, Synthesis in Trial Procedure?—The Experience of International Criminal Tribunals, INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 50.1(26), 4 (2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 87].
52

Id. at 7.
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the Trial Chamber.”53 The principle of equality of arms “encapsulates the rights of access,
information, confrontation, and representation, and has been invoked in the ECHR over issues
such as failure to furnish documents to a party, failure to give reasons, refusal to admit evidence,
and the use of court appointed experts.”54
“In 1986 the ECHR first held that a criminal conviction based on evidence which an
American court would describe as hearsay was a violation of Article 6(3) of the Convention.”55
In Unterpertinger v. Austria56, the Court said “that hearsay could be used if the use complied
with the rights of the defendant. This opinion stopped without trying to describe how that might
occur.”57 In the Unterpertinger case, the defendant was convicted on the basis of testimony that
was derived from written statements taken from his wife and stepdaughter. The two women had
refused to testify. The Court stated that “the reading out of statements in this way cannot be
regarded as being inconsistent with Article 6(1) and (3)(d) of the Convention, but the use of
them must nevertheless comply with the rights of the defence,”58 especially in a criminal trial
when the defendant has not had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.
It is understandable how the Court determined that Unterpertinger was not accorded a
fair trial as required by the Convention, since the witnesses were available to testify at trial, but

53

Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Motion by the Prosecution to Allow the Investigators
to Follow the Trial During the Testimonies of Witnesses, Trial Chamber (20 Mar. 1997), para. 6. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebooks at Tab 28].

54

Findlay, supra note 51, at 11. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 87].

55

Roger W. Kirst, Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation in the European Court of Human Rights, 21 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 777, 778 (2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 88].
56

Unterpertinger v. Austria, 110 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A)(1987), in (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 175. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebooks at Tab 54].

57

Kirst, supra note 55, at 783. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 88].

58

Unterpertinger, supra note 56, (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. at 184. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab
54].
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chose not to do so. However, had the witnesses been unavailable to testify, the reading of the
written statements would have been permissible under the language of the Convention.
ii. France
Article 6.3.d of the European Convention on Human Rights “grants the accused the right
‘to examine or have examined witnessed against him and to obtain the attendance of witnesses
on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.”59 Article 6.1 grants the
accused the right to a fair trial. “The European Court of Human Rights, and the French Court of
Cassation, have held that these provisions require the trial court to grant defendant’s request to
summon and question a witness unless the witness is clearly unavailable…”60 “Notwithstanding
the somewhat expanded right to confront during appellate proceedings, the French system does
not need to place a priority on a defendant’s right to confront because a judge is the party
responsible for the examination of witnesses.”61
The French Penal Code has a provision that punishes an individual with life
imprisonment for the murder of a witness, a victim or a party to a civil suit done to prevent them
from providing information, filing suit, or testifying at trial.62 This provision seems to support
the hearsay exception of forfeiture by wrongdoing found in the United States and Canada. By
punishing an individual for making a witness unavailable, one can assume that a statement

59

Richard S. Frase, “France,” in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 143-186, 170 (Craig M. Bradley
ed., 1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 58].

60

Id.

61

Antonia Sherman, Sympathy for the Devil: Examining a Defendant’s Right to Confront Before the International
War Crimes Tribunal, 10 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 833, 864. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 93].

62

LE NOUVEAU CODE PENAL 66 (1993), Article 221-4, 5° « Le meurtre est puni de la réclusion criminelle à
perpétuité lorsqu’il est commis: Sur un témoin, une victime ou une partie civile, soit pour l’empêcher de dénoncer
les faits, de porter plainte ou de déposer en justice, soit en raison de sa dénonciation, de sa plainte ou de sa
déposition. » [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 69].
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offered against the accused by the unavailable witness would then be allowed into evidence,
because the accused should not be rewarded for disposing of a witness against him.
“Under the 1958 Constitution, criminal procedure falls within the legislative domain of
article 34, and therefore regulation play only a limited role in this area, primarily applying
parliamentary legislation.”63 Article 55 of the Constitution holds that legislation must be in
conformity with international treaties, and in the context of criminal procedure, article 6 of the
1950 European Convention for the Safeguard of Human Rights “protects the right to a fair trial
in the criminal field.”64 “In practice, the Criminal Division of the Cour de cassation generally
takes the view that for matters of criminal procedure its principal source is the Code, and the
Convention is only of secondary importance.”65 French law recognizes five types of evidence,
including written and oral.66 Article 1 of An Act of 31 May 200067 says
The criminal procedure must be fair and give due hearing to the parties and
preserve the balance between the parties’ rights. It must guarantee the separation
of the authorities responsible for the prosecution and the trial. People finding
themselves in similar conditions and prosecuted for the same facts must be
judged according to the same rules.68

63

CATHERINE ELLIOTT, FRENCH CRIMINAL LAW 11 (2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab
62].

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

ANDRE HUET, LES CONFLITS DE LOI EN MATIERE DE PREUVE 167 (1965). « Le droit français a essentiellement
prévu et réglementé cinq moyens de preuve, ‘la preuve littérale, la preuve testimoniale, les présomptions, l’aveu de
la partie et le serment’ (art. 1316 C. civ.)». [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 63].
67

ELLIOTT, supra note 63, at 11. Loi no. 2000-516 du 15 juin 2000 renforçant la protection de la présomption
d’innocence et les droits des victimes. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 62].
68

Id. at 12. « La procédure pénale doit être équitable et contradictoire et préserver l’équilibre des droit des parties.
Elle doit garantir la séparation des autorités chargées de l’action publique et des autorités de jugement. Les
personnes se trouvant dans des conditions semblables et poursuivies pour les mêmes infractions doivent être jugées
selon les mêmes règles».
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“It should be noted that because of the inquisitorial nature of French criminal procedure,
witnesses are permitted to give evidence which to a British lawyer might be regarded as hearsay
evidence…”69 This is true of most civil law jurisdictions, as it left to the trier of fact to
determine if evidence is admissible and to accord it the appropriate weight when making the
final judgment. “The trial hearing has always mixed elements of the inquisitorial and adversarial
system as it usually takes place in public with a limited opportunity for the parties to put their
case orally, but the written file on the case prepared during the pre-trial investigations is central
to the hearing.”70 In the French system, there is great reliance on the written record, as the Court
is trying to find the truth in the matter, and does so by reviewing all relevant evidence, no matter
what form it takes. If the Court did not permit written testimony to be admitted into evidence,
then it may not be made aware of information necessary to decide a case.
iii. Germany and Switzerland
“The first sentence of section 250 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, adopted in
1877, but still in force, broadly proclaims: ‘If evidence of a fact rests upon a person’s
observation, this person must be examined at the trial.”71 This sentence pertains to what would
be regarded as written hearsay in common law jurisdictions.72 “Inadmissible evidence is
excluded from the trial, but professional judges usually are aware of it from the dossier of the
case.”73 The court may “use the record of a prior judicial examination when a witness is

69

ANDREW WEST ET AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 257 (2d ed. 1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebooks at Tab 77].
70

ELLIOTT, supra note 63, at 13. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 62].

71

Damaška, supra note 50, at 449. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 83].

72

Id .at 450.
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hindered from appearing at trial.”74 Since German judges control fact-finding and are
responsible for the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the evidentiary material, the German
Code of Criminal Procedure “requires the court to extend the reception of evidence to ‘all means
of evidence which are important for the decision.”75
“German criminal procedure combines principles of the inquisitorial process with those
of purely accusatorial procedure…Inquisitorial elements only enter the proceedings once charges
have been filed. At that point the judge assumes direction of the proceedings.”76 “The most
important sources of law for the ‘constitution’ of the courts and for criminal procedure are the
Code of Criminal Procedure (Reichsstrafprozeßordnung) and the Judicature Act
(Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) of 1877.” “In view of the danger that may be posed to fundamental
human rights during the course of a criminal trial, Germany’s Constitution (Grundgesetz—GG)
with its catalogue of fundamental human rights is also an important source of law.”77 The courts
must interpret the Code of Criminal Procedure in light of the Basic Law of 1949, and due to the
“fundamental procedural guarantees” found in the European Convention of Human Rights, the
Basic Law must be interpreted in light of the values of the Convention.78
In terms of evidentiary principles, the principle of immediacy “requires the court to
obtain the most direct and immediate impression of the events charged (§ 261

73

Thomas Weigand, “Germany,” in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 187-216, 208 (Craig M. Bradley
ed., 1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 58].

74

Damaška, supra note 50, at 450. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 83].

75

Id. at 454.

76

Gerhard Dannecker & Julian Roberts, “The Law of Criminal Procedure,” in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW
413-449, 414 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at
Tab 65].
77

Id. at 416.

78

Id. at 417. Interpretation in conformity with human rights is menschenrechtskonforme Auslegung.
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Strafprozeßordnung—StPO).”79 Generally, witnesses must be directly examined at trial, “and
this examination may not be replaced by reading out the record of some earlier examination or
by a written statement (§ 250 StPO).”80
In Switzerland, there is not a consistent view on hearsay evidence, as the federal and
cantonal systems are not always in agreement with each other. “It must be borne in mind
that…Switzerland is a federative state. When it was founded in 1848, legislation in criminal
matters was not attributed to the Confederation but remained with the cantons…Even now
cantonal criminal law continues to exist along with federal legislation.”81 The Federal Tribunal
has held that the rule of nullum crimen sine lege “is incorporated in Article 4 of the Federal
Constitution which guarantees to everyone equality before the law without discrimination and is
construed as a general protection against arbitrariness including a guarantee to a fair trial.”82
“The Federal Tribunal also often refers to the legal doctrine of neighbouring countries—the most
important influence on legal thinking in the field of criminal law comes from the Federal
Republic of Germany.”83 The Swiss courts will refer to jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights and neighboring countries, and the federal view on the admissibility of hearsay
evidence would be one consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights and other
civil law jurisdictions.
iv. Rwanda

79

Dannecker & Roberts, supra note 76, at 428. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 65].

80

Id. at 429.

81

S. Trechsel, “Criminal Law,” in INTRODUCTION TO SWISS LAW 213-236, 213 (François Dessemontet & Tuğrul
Ansay eds., 1981). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 66].
82

Id. at 213-214.

83

Id. at 217.
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Like the French, the Rwandan legal system recognizes five types of evidence, including
written and oral testimony. The Rwandan system admits all pertinent evidence in accordance
with the Franco-Germanic legal tradition.84 Like other civil law jurisdictions, the Rwandan
system allows for any relevant evidence to be admitted. Rwandan law recognizes five types of
evidence, including written evidence.85 A witness is not automatically required to testify in
court, as the dossier may be sufficient to establish the necessary evidence.86 The Rwandan code
echoes the ICCPR and the African Charter by recognizing the right of the accused to examine or
have examined the witnesses against him.87
In regards to the creation of the ICTR, the Rwandan Government has expressed some
misgivings, ranging from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, its location in Arusha, and the penalties
for the crimes over which it exercises jurisdiction.88 Rwandan laws would allow for the death
penalty for those convicted of the commission of genocide. The ICTR Statute does not allow for
capital punishment, which is consistent with the view of most countries today, particularly the
countries of Europe. “Therefore, the individuals who committed the most serious crime could
get less than life imprisonment in the ICTR while lower level perpetrators tried in Rwanda could
84

MARTIN IMBLEAU & WILLIAM K. SCHABAS, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT RWANDAIS 62-63 (1999). « La preuve peut
être établie par tout moyen de fait ou de droit, pourvu qu’elle soumise à un débat contradictoire (art. 17 CPP).
Contrairement à la common law avec ses règles de preuve très techniques, le système d’inspiration romanogermanique admet en preuve tous les éléments à la condition qu’ils soient pertinents ». [Reproduced in the
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receive the death penalty.”89 In light of the passage of Security Council Resolutions 1503 and
1534, which are discussed later in further detail, the fact that the Rwandan courts may administer
the death penalty, could make it necessary for the testimony of dead witnesses as to the acts and
conduct of the accused in the indictment, even if this is inconsistent with Rule 92bis. The
Rwandan Government has severed relations in the past when it has disagreed with the actions of
the Tribunal and may do so in the future. In the event that prosecutions may be turned over to
the courts of a nation that has not always agreed with the work of the Tribunal, in the interests of
expediting justice, it may be in the best interests of the ICTR to amend Rule 92bis to allow for
written statements of deceased witnesses to go to proof of the acts and conduct charged in the
indictment. There is a shortage of prosecutors and defense attorneys in Rwanda at present,
which would inhibit the rights of individuals to a fair and expeditious trial guaranteed under the
ICTR Statute.90
B. Common Law Jurisdictions
The general rule concerning the admissibility of evidence in the Commonwealth nations
was that set out by Lord Goddard, CJ in Kuruma v. R.91
In their Lordships’ opinion the test to be applied in considering whether the
evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is,
admissible and the court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained.92
In Canada, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms departed from this rule.
Section 24(2) provides that evidence “obtained subsequent to a violation of the Charter must be
excluded in any case where the admission of evidence in the proceedings would bring the
89
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administration of justice into dispute.”93 In the United Kingdom, the Criminal Justice Act 1988
addresses evidentiary issues before the courts. While the modern legal systems of the United
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom all evolved from the common law tradition, they have
diverged in their thinking about and application of the hearsay rule.
i.

The United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, “no statutory definition of hearsay existed until the Civil
Evidence Act 1995 came into effect on 31 January 1997.”94 The definition in this act defines
hearsay as “a statement made otherwise than by a person while giving oral evidence in the
proceedings which is tendered as evidence of the matters stated.”95 The definition does not apply
to criminal cases, however, even though other definitions in the act do extend to criminal cases.96
“Almost as soon as the rule against hearsay had been formulated, the judges recognized the
necessity for some exceptions and began to create them.”97 Myers v. Director of Public
Prosecutions98 was a landmark case in regards to hearsay. In Myers, the majority “held that that
era of judicial creation of major exceptions had ended, and that the time had come for Parliament
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to provide a comprehensive legislative basis for the rule and the exceptions to it.”99 Lord Reid
stated in Myers:
The only satisfactory solution is by legislation following on a wide survey of the
whole field, and I think that such a survey is long overdue. A policy of make do
and mend is no longer adequate. The most powerful argument of those who
support the strict doctrine of precedent is that if it is relaxed judges will be
tempted to encroach on the proper field of the legislature…100
“To this day, there has been no comprehensive, systematic legislative treatment of hearsay in
criminal cases.”101
“The rules at common law show that declarations made by persons since deceased are
admissible, exceptionally, to prove the facts contained in them, in four kinds of cases…”102
These are matters of public concern, declarations against interest, declarations in the course of
duty, and dying declarations in homicide cases. “Not until the Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984, was any broad attempt made to introduce documentary hearsay evidence into criminal
cases.”103 Section 23 of the Criminal Justice Act allows for firsthand documentary evidence to
be admitted if “the maker of the statement is unavailable to give evidence or it would be
pointless to call him as a witness.”104
Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 states,:
In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow the evidence on which the
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having
99
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regard to all the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission
of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.105
This seems to codify the power that the English judiciary had in the common law prior to
the decision of the Privy Council in Myers.106
ii. Canada
“Normally hearsay evidence is thought of as being evidence by a witness which consists
of his relating something which he was told by another person.”107 The Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council said “It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to
establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when
it is proposed to establish by the evidence not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was
made.”108 The Canada Evidence Act makes no mention of hearsay testimony in its language. In
regards to the cross-examination of witnesses, the Act states that “On any trial a witness may be
cross-examined as to previous statements that the witness made in writing, or that have been
reduced to writing, or that have been recorded on audio tape or video tape or otherwise, relative
to the subject-matter of the case…”109
The Privy Council in Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor110, stated:
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Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called
as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the
object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the
statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by
the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made.111
“Special attention has been given to hearsay as being particularly fraught with untrustworthiness
because its evidential value rests on the credibility of an out-of-court asserter who is not subject
to the oath, cross-examination or a charge of perjury.”112
“The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. O’Brien113 had occasion to comment on what is
and what is not hearsay.”114 In this case, there were two defendants, O’Brien and Jensen. “On
appeal, the question arose as to whether Jensen’s statement could be admitted through the
testimony of O’Brien’s lawyer.”115
The evidence of Mr. Simon was offered for the purpose of proving the truth of
the matter asserted. It was sought, through that evidence, to prove that Jensen,
and not O’Brien, had committed the act with which O’Brien stood charged, or at
least to raise a reasonable doubt as to O’Brien’s guilt. That is the classic
touchstone of inadmissible hearsay.116
This case provides a good example of how hearsay evidence is examined in Canadian
jurisprudence and the justices’ desire to prevent hearsay evidence from being admitted if
it does not fit within one of the hearsay exceptions.
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Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms “guarantees the rights
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by the law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”117 “Section 1 of the
Charter performs a dual function in that it constitutionally guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in succeeding section of the Charter, and at the same time, establishes
the criteria by which those guaranteed rights may be limited.”118 Canadian courts have
referred to the wording and judicial interpretation of international documents, with the
United Nations Covenant on Social and Political Rights and the European Convention
being “frequently referred to in the interpretations of s. 1, 2(a), 2(d), 7, 8, 9, 11(b), 11(d)
and 12 of the Charter.”119 This is consistent with the decisions and judgments of the
ICTY and the ICTR in reference to the rights of the accused.
“The appropriateness of judicial reference to international documents as aids to the
interpretations of the Charter has now been made clear by Chief Justice Dickson of the Supreme
Court of Canada in [Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v. A.G.].”120
[T]he various sources of international human rights law—declarations, covenants,
conventions, judicial and quasi judicial decisions of international tribunals, customary
norms must, in my opinion, be relevant and persuasive sources for the interpretation of
the Charter’s provisions.121
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“Perhaps the best approach would be for courts to analyze all hearsay-by-conduct evidence in the
terms of possibility of the dangers of defective perception, insincerity, memory, or
communication, and ambiguity of inference raised by such untested evidence.”122 R. v. Potvin
may serve as a guide. “The Crown tendered as evidence the transcript of the declarant’s
testimony at the preliminary which satisfied the statutory conditions for admissibility under the
provisions of the Criminal Code permitting such evidence to be received at trial.”123
…the right to confront unavailable witnesses at trial is neither an established nor
a basic principle of fundamental justice. To the extent that s. 7 guarantees the
accused a fair trial, it cannot be said, in the absence of circumstances which
negated or minimized the accused’s opportunity to cross-examine the witness
when the previous testimony was given, that the admission of the previously
obtained testimony under s. 643(1)124 was unfair to the accused. It is the
opportunity to cross-examine and not the fact of cross-examination which is
crucial if the accused is to be treated fairly. The same is true of the accused’s
right to a fair trial guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Charter.125
LaForest J. cites to R v. Sang126 saying “That case, and others there referred to, make it clear that
under English law, a judge in a criminal trial always has a discretion to exclude evidence if, in
the judge’s opinion, its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.”127 The accused “would
have a constitutional right to have the evidence of prior testimony obtained in the absence of a
full opportunity to cross-examine the witness excluded.”128 As one commentator notes “it seems
only a matter of time before the Supreme Court of Canada recognizes that judges have the
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discretion to exclude technically admissible evidence in criminal cases, whenever its prejudicial
impact outweighs its probative value.”129
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Canadian Bill of Rights enshrine
the rights of Canadians, including the right to justice and a fair trial. The language in these two
documents was inspired by international covenants, such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European
Convention.130 The Charter replaces the Bill of Rights, but that does not mean that the rights that
existed in the Bill of Rights no longer exist simply because the wording has changed or does not
exist anymore in the language of the Charter. “The due process clause does not appear in the
Charter.”131 “The accused…has the right to compel attendance of witnesses and cross-examine
them.”132 Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms “has been interpreted to
protect the accused’s right to present full answer and defence.”133 The language of section 7 of
the Charter states that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person and the right
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”134
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Section 11(d) provides individuals with the right to a fair trial as a principle of fundamental
justice.135
In R. v. Hawkins, Section 715 of the Criminal Code was addressed by the
Supreme Court. Section 715 of the Criminal Code
provides that where, at the trial of an accused, a person whose evidence was
given at a previous trial on the same charge, or whose evidence was taken in the
investigation of the charge or on the preliminary inquiry into the charge…is
dead…and where it is proved that the evidence was taken in the presence of the
accused, it may be read as evidence in the proceedings without further proof.136
The Court reiterates the existence of a principled exception to the hearsay rule “which seeks to
give effect to the underlying purposes of the rule.”137 “Under this reformed framework, a
hearsay statement will be admissible for the truth of its contents if it meets the separate
requirements of ‘necessity’ and ‘reliability’.”138
With regards to hearsay testimony, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Starr139 ordered
a new trial in a murder case where a witness’s testimony about a victim’s statement of intention
had been admitted into evidence. Starr is one of the most recent cases which continue the
“principled approach” to hearsay which states “hearsay evidence may be admissible,
notwithstanding the inapplicability of the categorical exceptions on the facts of the case,
provided the criteria of necessity and reliability set out in Khan are met.”140 This mirrors the
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criteria set out in Ohio v. Roberts in the United States, which has since been overturned by
Crawford v. Washington.
Dying declarations are admitted into evidence in Canada, as they are in the United States.
“In trials for murder or manslaughter, a written or oral statement of a deceased person is
admissible evidence as to his cause of death provided he made the statement while he was under
a settled hopeless expectation of death and provided he would have been a competent witness
had he lived.”141
iii. The United States
In common law jurisdictions, the testimony of a dead witness would be classified as
hearsay testimony. In the United States, hearsay is generally inadmissible. Hearsay in United
States federal courts is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”142
Rule 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that “hearsay is not admissible except as
provided by these rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by
Act of Congress.”143 Rule 804 outlines the exception the Hearsay Rule when the declarant is
unavailable. “Unavailability of a witness” includes a situation in which the declarant “is unable
to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental
illness or infirmity.”144 The two exceptions to hearsay in Rule 804 that are most relevant to the
issue at hand are those dealing with a witness’s former testimony and forfeiture by wrongdoing.
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Rule 804(b)(1) allows for past testimony to be entered into evidence if the declarant is
unavailable as defined by Rule 804(a)(1) and the past statement was given under oath at a
proceeding or deposition and was subject to examination by the party against whom it was
offered.145 Rule 804(b)(6) allows for “a statement offered against a party that has engaged in or
acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did procure the unavailability of the
declarant as a witness.”146
In United States v. Houlihan147, the First Circuit stated that “a defendant who wrongfully
procures a witness’s absence for the purpose of denying the government that witness’s testimony
waives his right under the Confrontation Clause to object to the admission of the absent
witness’s hearsay statements.”148 The Court also held that the defendants in Houlihan, when
they waived their confrontation right, “they simultaneously waived their right to object on
hearsay grounds to the admission of his out-of-court statements.”149 “English and American
courts have consistently relaxed the hearsay rule when the defendant wrongfully causes the
witness’s unavailability.”150 The relevance to the testimony of a dead witness before the ICTR is
if the accused caused the witness’s death prior to the indictment or after.
Rule 804(2) allows for dying declarations to be admitted into evidence “in a prosecution
for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing
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that the declarant’s death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the
declarant believed to be impending death.”151
Rule 804(b)(6) is applicable only when the defendant has wrongfully caused a witness to
be unavailable to testify. In the instance of a dead witness’s testimony before the ICTR, this
would be relevant if the defendant wrongfully procures a witness’s unavailability, by arranging
for their death in some manner.
Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice…”152 As one commentator notes,
“where the Court has identified values inherent in certain constitutional provisions, it has
defended those values even despite some cost. As is true of specific constitutional provisions,
the sixth amendment as a whole has a value. That value is balance.”153
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution asserts that “in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”154 In Ohio
v. Roberts155 the U.S. Supreme Court established a two-part test to apply the Confrontation
Clause to the admissibility of hearsay. This test established the rules of necessity and reliability.
In 2004, the way the Confrontation Clause is applied to hearsay statements changed in Crawford
v. Washington.156 Justice Scalia cited to Roberts, which says “an unavailable witness’s out-of-
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court statement may be admitted so long as it has adequate indicia of reliability—i.e., falls within
a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or bears ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”157
“The common-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial
testing, while the civil law condones examination in private by judicial officers.”158
V.

The Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence at the ICTR and Evidentiary Principles
which are Applicable to the Testimony of Dead Witnesses as to the Acts and
Conduct of the Accused
A. Article 20(4)(e)
Article 19(1) of the ICTR Statute states the Trial Chamber “shall ensure that a trial is fair

and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of
victims and witnesses.”159

The principle of unus testis, nullus testis has been invoked by the

accused in several cases before the ICTY and the ICTR, but as noted in the Tadić, the
requirement of “testimonial corroboration of a single witness’s evidence as to a fact in issue, is in
almost all modern legal systems no longer a feature.”160 The ICTR in the Akayesu case held that
a “Chamber can rule on the basis of a single testimony provided such testimony is, in its opinion,
relevant and credible.”161
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In the Nahimana case, the defense made a motion to hear the evidence of a witness by
deposition. The defense counsel submitted that Witness Y was in ill health and could not travel
to Arusha to testify in person, and also feared that he may be targeted upon arriving in Africa.162
The Trial Chamber determined that it was in the interest of justice to hear the witness and as he
could not travel to Arusha, that there were “exceptional circumstances” that are required by Rule
71 .163 A similar defense motion was granted for the deposition of expert witness for one of
Nahimana’s co-defendants.164
In Ntagerura165 the Trial Chamber observed that “prior written statements of witnesses
were not systematically tendered into evidence in their entirety. When the parties used such
statements during trial, they read the relevant portions of the statements into the record.”166 In
both Nahimana and Ntagerura, the Tribunal has sought to accommodate both the Defense and
the Prosecution when it comes to witness testimony. The instance of the testimony of a dead
witness should be no different.
The judges for the ICTY looked to the suggestions of the United States when it came
time to draft the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. “As a result of the drafting process, the
judges ended up embracing a largely adversarial approach to their Rules of Procedures, rather
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than the inquisitorial system prevailing in continental Europe.”167 When the Tribunal admits a
hearsay statement, “the author of the statement has never appeared before the tribunal and the
statement has never been subject to the scrutiny of cross-examination. At trial, it is important to
review the record with an eye for determining which evidence is first hand and which is second
hand.”168 “The question of ‘the alleged author not appearing as a witness’s affects the right of
the accused to confrontation pursuant to Article 21(4)(e). As with hearsay evidence, the
admissibility of evidence under Rule 89(C) has been found not to violate Article 21(4)(e).”169
The Rules “advocate the principle of due process of law and enumerate several
guarantees ensuring fundamental fairness and substantial justice. This is also by the
implementation of the sub-principle of ‘equality of arms,’ whereby the accuser and accused are
equal in procedural perspective.”170 However, if the testimony of dead witnesses is admitted in
evidence at the Tribunal, it may prove difficult to ensure that both sides are equal. If the witness
was dead prior to the trial, and the statement was not made under oath, then it is pure hearsay,
and the probative value may be outweighed by the prejudice to the defendant. If the witness had
been deposed, or testified before the Tribunal and then died, the admissibility of the testimony is
at issue if it was not done in the presence of the accused, or if the accused did not have the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
As mentioned earlier, the ICTY addressed the issue of admitting the statement of a
deceased witness in to evidence. “The statement had been taken by the Prosecutor’s investigator

167

PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE?: WAR CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 106 (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 78].
168

ACKERMAN & O’SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 421. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 55].

169

Id.

170

KNOOPS, supra note 43, at 221. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 67].

35

in 1995, and the witness had died in the interim. The witness had not sworn to the statement,
and had, of course, not been subject to cross-examination.”171 The appellant referred to Article
21(4)(e) to argue against the admission of the statement.172 The Prosecution noted that an ICTY
Trial Chamber “at the defense’s request, allowed a prior out-of court statement of this very same
dead witness, and the Appeals Chamber upheld it.”173 The reason that the Appeals Chamber
rejected the admission of the statement was that it “was the only evidence of the accused’s
presence in a particular place at a critical time.”174 Had the Appeals Chamber not overturned the
Trial Chamber in this instance, then it would have been infringing on the accused’s rights that
are outlined in Article 21 of the Statute of the ICTY and Article 20 of the Statute of the ICTR.
The decision to allow for anonymous witnesses to testify before the tribunal
Rule 94bis(C) states “If the opposing party accepts the statement of the expert witness,
the statement may be admitted into evidence by the Trial Chamber without calling the witness to
testify in person.”175 “Expert witnesses may testify; however, if the opposing party accepts the
statement of the expert witness, the statement may be admitted without calling the witness to
trial.”176 If the opposing party would accept the statement of a dead witness, the reasoning
behind Rule 94bis(C) may allow for their statements to be admitted into evidence.
B. The Ruling on Anonymity of Witnesses in the Tadić Judgment and the Rule on
Expert Testimony
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The issue of the anonymity of witnesses arose in Tadić, when the Prosecutor sought the
protection of three witnesses by granting them anonymity. Article 20(4)(e) of the ICTR Statute
and Article 21(4)(e) of the ICTY Statute state the accused has the right “to examine, or have
examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses
on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.”177 “The attention that the
Protective Measures Decision in the Tadić case has received is based on its final result of
permitting the trial to proceed on the basis of anonymous testimony.”178 The use of anonymous
testimony by the Tribunal was widely criticized by the international legal community, as this
would not be permitted in most jurisdictions, particularly in common law jurisdictions, where it
would be inconsistent with the right to confrontation embodied in the common law and
capitalized on in the Confrontation Clause existing in U.S. jurisprudence.
The Tribunal has the ability to grant anonymity to a witness pursuant to Rule 69179 and
Rule 75.180 The Trial Chamber in Tadić “held that anonymity would be permissible if a highly
detailed five-prong balancing test could be satisfied.”181 The issue of anonymity seemingly has
no relevance to the admissibility of the testimony of a dead witness, especially since it was
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widely criticized by the international legal community and has not been done since. The identity
of witnesses may be kept anonymous by the Trial Chambers until a time when it is necessary for
the Defense to be able to prepare for cross-examination.
However, the second and third prongs of the anonymity balancing test are helpful in
illustrating the importance of a witness’s testimony to the Prosecutor’s case. The Trial Chamber
in the second prong “the evidence must be sufficiently relevant and important to make it unfair to
the prosecution to compel the Prosecutor to proceed without it.”182 The third prong requires a
lack of “prima facie evidence that the witness is untrustworthy.”183 “This requirement in effect
protects the process against testimony of witnesses with extensive criminal backgrounds and puts
the onus on the Prosecutor to perform a thorough background check of the witnesses. The
Prosecutor must also file a report on the reliability of the witness with the Court and the
Defense.”184
The Trial Chamber in Tadić recognized that the decision regarding anonymity of a
witness was controversial and asserted that Article 21(4)(e) would not be violated if the accused
had the opportunity to question the witness. With a dead witness, however, the accused does not
have the ability to cross-examine the witness which is a right afforded them under Article
21(4)(e). The ICTY developed guidelines to ensure fairness by stating that judges “must be able
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to observe the demeanor of a witness in order to ensure the reliability of the testimony.”185 By
observing the demeanor of a witness, the judge has the opportunity to gauge their sincerity.
VI.

Conclusion
In international law, it is generally accepted that anyone accused of a crime has a right to

fair trial. This right is codified in the various legal systems around the world. The Statute for
the ICTY and the Statute for the ICTR are no different. Article 21 of the Statute for the ICTY
and Article 20 of the Statute for the ICTR codify general international principles concerning the
rights of the accused in criminal proceedings.
The Tribunals have permitted hearsay testimony to be admitted into evidence. By
allowing depositions to be taken in place of live testimony, the Tribunals have established that
live testimony, while preferred under the Rules and precedent of the Tribunals, is not always
possible, nor is it always necessary. The testimony of dead witnesses is often relevant and
highly probative, and neither the Prosecutor nor the defense should be precluded from entering
such testimony into evidence, especially if it is necessary to prove their case. There are hearsay
exceptions in both the common law and civil law traditions, and while the common law hearsay
rules are seemingly stricter than their civil law counterparts, they still allow for testimony to
come in if it is relevant and probative and not prejudicial to the accused.
Both the United States and Canada make hearsay generally inadmissible, unless the
testimony of the witness was done under oath. In that case, the testimony may be admissible if it
is given before a grand jury or during trial. While the Tribunal takes its adversarial approach
from the common law tradition, in terms of the testimony of dead witnesses, if classified as
hearsay, it should begin to look at the hearsay exceptions present in the United States and
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Canadian legal systems. The main issue with admitting any hearsay evidence is that the
declarant may not be the witness at trial, and the accused does not have an adequate opportunity
to exercise his or her right to examine a witness or to confront his accuser. The Court in the
same article of the Statute is concerned with the rights of witnesses and victims, and if hearsay
testimony is the only way that justice will be served, it may be necessary to admit it. Hearsay
testimony, for the most part, cannot be corroborated, and the testimony may be distorted by the
time the Court hears the testimony. The Tribunal must balance the interests of justice with the
rights of the accused as outlined in the Statute. Testimony of dead witnesses should be admitted
into evidence on a case-by-case basis, with the judges being mindful of the weighing test that is
found in the common law tradition.
The Security Council in Resolution 1503 “calls on the ICTY and ICTR to take all
possible measures to complete investigations by the end of 2004, to complete all trial activities at
first instance by the end of 2008, and to complete all work in 2010.”186 Under this resolution, it
is advisable that the Tribunal allow for the testimony of dead witnesses to be admitted into
evidence, if the reliability of the testimony can be verified. This follows the precedent of both
the ICTY in Blaškić and the ICTR. By allowing for such testimony to be admitted into evidence,
it may create expediency at the Tribunal, and the Office of the Prosecutor can complete the job it
was assigned under the Statute. Resolution 1534 calls on the ICTR Prosecutor “to review the
case load . . . in particular with a view to determining which cases should be proceeded with and
which should be transferred to competent national jurisdictions.”187 In light of these resolutions
and the state of the Rwandan national courts at present, it is advisable that the ICTR allow for the
testimony of dead witnesses as to the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the
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indictment to be admitted under Rule 89 as hearsay testimony has been admitted under the rule
in previous judgments. It is also advisable that the Judges, the Prosecutor or the Registrar
propose an amendment to Rule 92bis to that effect to comply with the aims of the ICTR Statute.
Rule 6 provides the Tribunal with the authority to amend the Rules. While Rule 6(C) requires
that they be amended with respect to the rights of the accused guaranteed under Article 20(4)(e)
of the ICTR Statute, “those rights are subject to the power of the Trial Chamber in [Article
19(1)] to ensure a fair and expeditious trial.”188 The ICTR Statute and ICTR Rules and the
jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR provide the necessary authority to allow the statement
of a dead witness as to the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment to be
admitted in evidence to the ICTR.
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